We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we …nd a large fraction [75.3%, 80.3%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [2.4%, 5.5%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.
Introduction
Strategic voting in elections has been of interest to researchers since Duverger (1954) and Downs (1957) . Models of strategic voting are fundamental to the study of political economy, and have been used to investigate topics ranging from performance of di¤erent electoral rules to information aggregation in elections. Whether voters actually behave strategically, however, is an empirical question.
Strategic voting is also of interest to politicians and voters. It is widely believed that if Ralph Nader had not run in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, Al Gore would have won the election. The presence of minor candidates and third parties a¤ects election outcomes, and the extent of that e¤ect depends heavily on the fraction and behavior of strategic voters.
In this paper, we study how to identify and estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact strategic voting has on election outcomes by adopting an inequalitybased estimator. We estimate the model using aggregate municipality level data from the Japanese general election which uses plurality rule. In our counterfactual policy experiments, we investigate election outcomes under alternative electoral rules. Strategic voters are de…ned as those who make voting decisions conditioning on the event that their votes are pivotal. Unlike sincere voters who always vote according to their preferences, strategic voters do not necessarily vote for their most preferred candidate in plurality-rule elections with three or more candidates. 1 In our paper, we make a clear distinction between strategic voting, as de…ned above (this is the standard de…nition in the theoretical literature 2 ) , and voting for a candidate other than the one the voter most prefers (hereafter referred to as misaligned voting). Strategic voters may vote for their most preferred candidate or they may not. Hence, the set of voters who engage in misaligned voting is only a subset of the set of strategic voters. Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two. In fact, previous attempts at estimating strategic voting have estimated misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. This distinction is important because the fraction of strategic voters is a model primitive while misaligned voting is an equilibrium object. In our paper we recover the extent of strategic voting, which allows us to conduct counterfactual policy experiments. Our model is an adaptation of Myerson and Weber (1993) and Myerson (2002) with the addition of sincere voters. 3 We relax the equilibrium requirement that Myerson and Weber 1 There are other behavioral models of voting, such as expressive voting (voters may vote for a candidate to send a signal). We focus on sincere voting and strategic voting, which have been the main focus of the emipirical literature. 2 See, e.g., the entry of "strategic voting" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics by Feddersen (2008) . 3 Our model can be naturally extended to elections with N candidates competing for N S (N S < N ) seats place on voters' beliefs on pivot probabilities. We use a weaker solution concept so that the outcome of the model is robust to di¤erent assumptions regarding voter beliefs and can better account for diverse patterns of outcome as observed in the data. 4 The consequence of adopting a weaker solution concept is that we have to deal with the issue of multiplicity of solution outcomes in identi…cation and estimation. The key source of the multiplicity of the solution outcomes -and hence the key source of di¢ culty in the identi…cation of the model -is the presence of strategic voters. The di¢ culty stems from the fact that preference and voting behavior do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence for strategic voters. Our identi…cation argument proceeds in three steps.
First we derive restrictions in terms of how preferences, which we write as a function of demographic characteristics, relate to voting behavior at the individual level. Unlike in other applications of discrete-choice models, the fact that a voter votes for candidate A does not imply that the voter preferred candidate A most. It could well be that the voter preferred candidate B over A, but voted for A instead because the voter believed that candidate B had little chance of winning. However, we can infer from the voter's behavior that the voter did not rank candidate A last in his order of preference. It is a weakly dominated strategy for all voters, sincere and strategic, to vote for their least preferred candidate.
Second, we relate aggregate variation in the vote share to demographic characteristics using two particular features often found in general-election data. The …rst feature is that general-election data typically consists of data from many elections taking place simultaneously (e.g., 646 elections for House of Commons in U.K., 435 elections for U.S. House of Representatives). This feature is essential for identi…cation and estimation because we take each election to be our unit of observation. The second feature is that the breakdown of votes and demographic characteristics within each electoral district is available. (e.g., county-level breakdown of votes for U.S. Congressional Elections). This data structure allows us to relate variation in the vote share to variation in the demographic characteristics within a single electoral district, holding constant common components such as beliefs over tie probabilities and candidate characteristics. This partially identi…es the preference parameters. (For the rest of the paper, we use the term "municipality" to denote the sub-district within an electoral district, such as counties. Note that several municipalities comprise one "district", which in turn corresponds to one election. See Figure 1 .) Lastly, we consider identi…cation of the extent of strategic voting. Intuitively, the variation in the data that we would like to exploit is the variation in the voting outcome among municipalities (in di¤erent districts) with similar characteristics vis-à-vis the variation in the under single non-transferrable voting as in Cox (1994) . 4 See footnote 12 for details. Figure 1 : Data Structure. The district is our unit of observation, each of which is comprised of multiple municipalities. Breakdown of data is available at the municipality level.
vote shares and characteristics of other municipalities in the same district. For example, consider two liberal municipalities, one in a generally conservative electoral district and the other in a generally liberal district. Suppose that there are three candidates, a liberal, a centrist and a conservative candidate in both districts. If there are no strategic voters, we would not expect the voting outcome to di¤er across the two municipalities. However, in the presence of strategic voters, the voting outcome in these two municipalities could di¤er.
If the strategic voters of the municipality in the conservative district believe that the liberal candidate has little chance of winning, those voters would vote for the centrist candidate, while strategic voters in the other municipality (in the liberal district) would vote for the liberal candidate according to their preferences (if they believe that the liberal candidate has a high chance of winning). More generally, given the preference parameters, the model can predict what the vote share would be in each municipality if all of the voters voted according to their preferences. If there were no strategic voters, the di¤erence between the actual outcome and the predicted sincere-voting outcome would only be due to random shocks. However, when there is a large number of strategic voters, the actual vote share can systematically diverge from the predicted outcome. This is due to the multiplicity of equilibria induced by strategic voters. Recall that strategic voters make voting decisions conditional on the event that their votes are pivotal. If the beliefs regarding the probability of being pivotal di¤er across electoral districts -and we have no reason to believe that they do not -the behavior of strategic voters will also di¤er across districts. This corresponds to di¤erent equilibria being played in di¤erent districts. Of course it is impossible to directly test for the relationship between voter behavior and voter beliefs regarding tie probabilities as beliefs are unobservable. However, we can still use the systematic di¤erence between the predicted vote share and the actual vote share to partially identify the fraction of strategic voters.
Our estimation applies an estimator based on moment inequalities developed by Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2007). We use a bounds estimator because our voting model does not yield a unique outcome and we may only be able to set-identify the model parameters.
We use data on the Japanese House of Representatives elections for estimation. 5 Once the primitives of the model have been estimated, we investigate the extent of strategic voting using the estimated model. In our counterfactual policy experiments, we study how the outcome would change under proportional representation and under the assumption that all voters vote sincerely. We …nd that a large proportion [75.3%, 80.3%] of voters are strategic voters. We also recover the extent of misaligned voting once we estimate the model, by simulating the equilibrium behavior. Our results show that [2.4%, 5.5%] of the voters engage in misaligned voting, or [3.0%, 7.3%] of the strategic voters. In our …rst counterfactual experiment, in which we introduce proportional representation, we …nd that the number of votes for major parties decreases by a large margin, and the number of seats decreases by an even greater margin.
In our second counterfactual experiment, we investigate what the outcome would be if all voters vote sincerely under plurality rule. We …nd that the number of seats for the parties would change signi…cantly: one party would add [17, 40] seats while another would lose [20, 45] seats out of a total of 175 seats. Even though the extent of misaligned voting is small [2.4%, 5.5%], the impact on the number of seats is considerable because the winning margin is often small.
Related Literature There are both an experimental and an empirical literature on strategic voting in elections. In small-scale laboratory experiments with three candidates under plurality rule, Weber (1993, 1996) …nd evidence of strategic voting. 6 They also …nd that strategic voting is more likely to occur if pre-election coordination devices such as polls and shared voting histories are available.
There is also a large empirical literature on strategic voting (see, e.g., Alvarez and Nagler (2000), Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2001) and papers cited therein). Previous work in the literature has attempted to identify strategic voting by comparing each voter's actual vote to his preferences. Voter preferences are proxied by measures such as voting behavior in previous elections and surveys eliciting voter preferences. However, as pointed out earlier, the di¤erence between voting and preferences is a measure of misaligned voting rather than that of strategic voting. Accordingly, our estimate of misaligned voting [2.4%, 5.5%] is comparable to the estimates of strategic voting reported in the previous literature, which ranges from 3% to 17%. 7 One closely related paper is Degan and Merlo (2007) . They consider the falsi…ability of sincere voting, and show that individual-level observations of voting in at least two elections are required to falsify sincere voting. They examine whether there exists a preference pro…le that is consistent with the observed election outcome without imposing any relationship between preferences and observable covariates. Our approach relates preferences to voter covariates within a standard discrete-choice framework. Identi…cation of voter preferences and the fraction of strategic voters is then possible without requiring data on repeated voting records. This is analogous to papers such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) which estimate individual preferences using aggregate data. 8 Our paper is also related to the literature on strategic voter turnout. Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999) and Coate, Conlin, and Moro (2008) estimate a model of voter turnout in which voter turnout is a function of the expected closeness of the election. These papers study turnout focusing on two candidate elections, a setting in which the issue of strategic voting does not arise. Our paper focuses on the issue of strategic voting instead of strategic turnout, although it is conceptually straightforward to extend our approach to a model of elections with both strategic voting and strategic turnout. We discuss this extension at the end of Section 4.
We describe the model in the next section, and explain the data in Section 3. Details on identi…cation and estimation are provided in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and the counterfactual experiments. Finally, we close the paper with concluding remarks in Section 6.
7 See Alvarez and Nagler (2000), Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2001) and papers cited therein. 8 Regarding the use of aggregate data, the political science literature has been concerend about the issue of ecological inference (See, e.g., King, 1997) . King (1997) proposes a solution to this problem by assuming a random coe¢ cients type model with a particular functional form. Our approach can be thought of as microfounding the distribution of the random coe¢ cients in his statistical model. We do so by considering a game theoretic model of voting.
Model

Model Set-up
Our model is an adaptation of Myerson and Weber (1993) [hereinafter denoted as MW] and Myerson (2002) . We model plurality-rule elections in which K candidates compete for one seat. Voters cast a vote for one candidate, 9 and the candidate receiving the highest number of votes is elected to o¢ ce (ties are broken with equal probability). We restrict attention to the case when K 3 since strategic voting is otherwise not an issue. There are M municipalities in an electoral district, and we use subscript m 2 f1; 2; :::; M g to denote a municipality. There are a …nite number of voters, M P m=1 N m < 1, who are the players of the game (N m is the number of voters in municipality m). Voter n's utility from having candidate k in o¢ ce is
where x n are voter characteristics, z k are candidate characteristics, km is a candidatemunicipality shock, such as the ability of a candidate to bring pork to municipality m, and
We consider two types of voters, sincere (behavioral) and strategic (rational). A sincere voter casts his vote for the candidate he prefers most, i.e., a sincere voter votes for candidate k if and only if u nk u nl ; 8l. On the other hand, a strategic voter casts his vote taking into consideration that the only events in which his vote is pivotal are when the election is exactly tied or when the second place candidate is one vote behind. When voter n is pivotal and he casts the decisive vote between k and l, he changes the outcome of the election. In this situation, voting for candidate k gives utility 1 2 (u nk u nl ). 10 Hence, if we let T n = fT n;kl g kl denote voter n's beliefs that candidates k and l will be tied for …rst place or that k will be one vote behind l, the expected utility from voting for candidate k is given by 11 u nk (T n ) = 1 2 P l2f1;::;Kg T n;kl (u nk u nl ), 9 We abstract from the issue of voter abstention. We discuss the issue of turnout at the end of Section 4. 10 Voter n's vote is pivotal in two cases. First, consider the case when candidates k and l are exactly tied without voter n's vote. In this case, candidate k wins if voter n votes for k. Because ties are broken with equal probability for each candidate, the utility from voting for candidate k is u nk 1 2 (u nk + u nl ). Second, consider the case when candidate k is one vote behind candidate l without voter n's vote. The two candidates will tie if voter n votes for candidate k, while candidate l wins if voter n does not. Thus, the utility from voting for k is 1 2 (u nk + u nl ) u nl . Therefore, in both cases, the utility from voting for candidate k is 1 2 (u nk u nl ): 11 We assume that voter beliefs over three-way ties are in…nitesimal compared to two-way ties, as is commonly assumed in the literature. as in MW. Strategic voters vote for candidate k if and only if u nk (T n )
Depending on the value of T n , strategic voters may choose to vote for any candidate other than the one he prefers the least (i.e. the candidate k with the lowest value of u nk ). We come back to this fact when we discuss identi…cation.
Note that we distinguish strategic voting and misaligned voting as discussed in the Introduction. We de…ne misaligned voting as casting a vote for a candidate other than the one the voter most prefers. Hence, only strategic voters engage in misaligned voting, but a strategic voter may or may not engage in misaligned voting. In other words, being a strategic voter is a necessary condition for misaligned voting, but not a su¢ cient condition.
We assume that for at least some candidate pair fk; lg, beliefs over pivot probability, T n;kl , is non-zero. Even if there is an obvious frontrunner, there is always some chance that a vote will be pivotal although it may be very small. As long as some T n;kl is always non-zero, we can normalize T n;kl so that P k P l>k T n;kl = 1. This normalization is possible because a voter's decision is determined by the relative size of u nk (T n ), which is not a¤ected by rescaling T n;kl by a constant factor.
We denote the type of voter n in municipality m by a random variable nm 2 f0; 1g drawn from a binomial distribution, where nm = 0 denotes the sincere voter and nm = 1 denotes the strategic voter. We also let the mean of the binomial distribution to be a random variable drawn for each municipality from some distribution F : Then the probability that voter n in municipality m is a strategic voter can be written as
where m is the municipality-level random term drawn from F a and we assume that nm ? n 0 m 8n; n 0 conditional on m . The probability that the voter is sincere is Pr( nm = 0j m ) = 1 m . We make the following assumption on beliefs T n following MW.
Assumption Beliefs over tie probabilities T n are common across all voters in the same electoral district, i.e., T n = T; 8 n 2 f1; :::; N 1 g [::: [ f1; :::; N M g.
This assumption simply imposes voters in the same electoral district to have common beliefs over pivot probabilities, T . The assumption re ‡ects the fact that information regarding the expected outcome of the election is widely available from news reports and poll results. By gaining access to this kind of information, voters in the same electoral district can form similar beliefs regarding the outcome.
Let V 
The total vote share for candidate k in municipality m is then
Note that these expressions are approximated by their expectation as the number of voters, N m ; becomes large;
where f m denotes the distribution of the demographic characteristics, x; in municipality m, and g denotes the distribution of idiosyncratic shock, " n = (" n1 ; :::; " nK ). We obtain these expressions by computing the vote share for candidate k among voters of a given demographic characteristics x, and then integrating this vote share with respect to characteristics x using its distribution f m . We obtain a similar expression for the total vote share as N m becomes large:
Solution Outcome
Until now, our model has been the same as the one considered in MW with the only di¤erence being the presence of sincere voters. In order to take the model to the data, we relax the consistency requirement on beliefs, T; that MW place in equilibrium. The equilibrium requirement on voters'beliefs imposed by MW results in outcomes that may not rationalize diverse patterns of actual election data even when we add sincere voters to their model.
To better account for the variation in the data and be robust to alternative speci…cations regarding beliefs, we weaken MW's consistency requirement on beliefs. Hence, our set of solution outcomes is a superset of the set of MW equilibria. Let us denote the district level vote share, which is the total number of votes obtained by a candidate divided by the total number of votes cast in the election, by
MW imposes the following consistency requirement in equilibrium: V k > V l ) T kj "T lj ; 8" 2 [0; 1); 8k; l; j. This implies that pivot probabilities involving candidates with low vote shares are zero. The consistency requirement (C1) we impose between beliefs, T; and the election outcomes is a weaker version of MW's ordering condition:
C1 : For an election with K candidates,
This condition implies that pivot probabilities involving candidates with high vote shares are larger than those with low vote shares. For the case of K = 3 with vote shares V 1 > V 2 > V 3 , C1 implies that T 12 T 13 T 23 , i.e., beliefs on the pivot probability between candidates 1 and 2, T 12 , is higher than those between candidates 1 and 3, T 13 , and so on.
Our second condition, C2, simply requires that given beliefs T , strategic voters vote optimally (and sincere voters vote for their most preferred candidate). Now we de…ne the solution outcome of the voting game.
De nition A set of solution outcomes
K is de…ned as the set
o such that C1 and C2 are satis…ed.
C1 : V k > V l ) T kj T lj 8k; l; j 2 f1; :::; Kg:
A few comments are in order. First, the set of solution outcomes, W , is not empty: That is, a solution outcome exists. This can be shown in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem receives zero votes (with beliefs fT 12 ; T 13; T 23 g = f1; 0; 0g).
Even if we (1) introduce sincere voters, (2) add shocks to voter preferences or (3) introduce randomness to the fraction of strategic voters (or any combination of (1), (2) , and (3)) to MW, there would still only be two types of equilibria: One with beliefs fT 12 ; T 13; T 23 g = fp; 1 p; 0g and the other with fT 12 ; T 13; T 23 g = f1; 0; 0g. As before, Equilibrium (i) has the undesirable property that the second and third candidates receive exactly the same number of votes. In equilibrium (ii), all three candidates can receive a positive and di¤erent number of votes, but the only beliefs that can support the equilibrium is fT 12 ; T 13; T 23 g = f1; 0; 0g; which is a strong assumption to impose, unlikely to hold in many races. 1 in MW. The proof is in Appendix A. Second, W is not a singleton in general. In order to cope with the issue of multiplicity of solution outcomes, we adopt an inequality-based estimator in our estimation. Third, W is a superset of the set of equilibria considered in MW. This is because condition C1 is weaker than that of MW. Finally, note that W does not depend on the information structure of the model, i.e., whether we assume that the voters know the realization nm and " nk of other voters, or only their distributions.
Finally, we remark on the empirical restriction implied by our solution outcome. Note that C2 embodies the restriction that no voter votes for his least preferred candidate through equations (1) and (2), which give the expressions for vote shares of the sincere and strategic voters. However, beyond this restriction, the model leaves considerable freedom in how
is linked to voter preferences. This is because the solution outcome does not pin down T (only a weak restriction is imposed via C1), nor do we observe the value of T . Hence, the empirical content of our solution outcome would be similar if we had instead adopted rationalizability 13 as our solution concept (See Bernheim, 1984 , Pearce, 1984 .
Data
We use data from the Japanese House of Representatives election held on September 11, 2005 . Out of a total number of 480 Representatives, 300 members were elected by plurality rule. We use the data from these 300 plurality-rule elections. 14 For each electoral district, the breakdown of vote-share data is available by municipality as shown in Figure 1 . An electoral district is usually comprised of several municipalities (9.26 on average, in our sample). 15 This particular data structure plays an important role in our identi…cation. We obtained the data on the vote shares and candidate characteristics from Yomiuri Shimbun, a national newspaper publisher. The demographic characteristics we use are obtained from the Social and Demographic Statistics of Japan published by the Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications. 16 We match these two data sets at the municipality level.
Out of a total of 300 districts, we keep the districts that satisfy the following criteria.
(i) There are three or four candidates, 17 and the composition of the candidates'parties in the district is any three or four of the following four parties; the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japan Communist Party (JCP), or the Yusei (YUS). Technically, the Yusei is not a single party, but we grouped former LDP candidates who split away from the LDP and ran on a common platform against postal privatization.
(ii) There are at least two municipalities within the electoral district.
(iii) There are no mergers of municipalities within the electoral district during the period from April 1, 2004 to the day of the election.
We are left with 175 electoral districts. We drop samples that do not satisfy criterion (i) because we treat party a¢ liation as a candidate characteristic, and we cannot precisely estimate the coe¢ cients on parties that only …elded a very small number of candidates. Criterion (i) ensures that we have enough elections with the same combination of parties …elding candidates to construct our moment inequalities. 18 We need criterion (ii) because our estimation requires at least two municipalities in each electoral district. Criterion (iii) is required to deal with an issue that arises when merging two data sets. Because the demographics data and the vote share data are collected on di¤erent dates (April 1, 2004 and September 11, 2005) , municipalities that merged with others between these dates are dropped from the sample. In some cases, however, we are able to match the data properly. When this is possible, we keep the merging municipalities in the sample. We report the descriptive statistics of electoral-district vote shares in Table 1 . There are 9.26 municipalities per electoral district on average. The average winner's vote share is about 52% and the winning margin is about 14%. The mean vote share of the winner is higher in three-candidate districts (52.9%) than in four-candidate districts (41.2%). The mean winning margin is also higher in three-candidate districts (14.2%) than in four-candidate districts (9.4%). Similarly, the margin between the second-and third-place candidates is mean st. dev. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of candidate characteristics. The …rst three rows contain information on the candidates'hometowns. 20 The next three rows provide descriptive statistics on the candidates' political experience. An average of 1.32 (in three-candidate districts) and 1.47 (in four-candidate districts) candidates are incumbents. Note that the number of incumbents is higher than 1 because some candidates who had previously been elected to the House of Representatives in a proportional-rule election ran in the plurality election. Less than 0.51 candidates on average have previously held public o¢ ce. In the estimation, we use the distribution of demographic characteristics, which is readily available for years of schooling and age. Regarding income, only the mean of the distribution was available at the municipality level. We use the prefectural Gini coe¢ cients as well as the average income to construct the distribution.
22 22 We have data on the total taxable income and the total number of taxpayers for each municipality. The mean income for each municipality can be computed from these numbers. We compute the quantiles of the income distribution by assuming a log-normal distribution where the variance is calculated by …tting the prefecture-level income distribution. Data on the prefecture-level income distritubtion is obtained from the 2004 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure published by the Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications.
Identi…cation and Estimation
We …rst describe the econometric speci…cation of the model we have presented in Section 2 in order to facilitate our identi…cation and estimation arguments. Then, we discuss identi…-cation of the model and estimation.
Speci…cation
We specify the utility function of voter n in municipality m with candidate k elected to o¢ ce as
where km is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic candidate-municipality level shock which follows a normal distribution, N (0; ), denoted as F ; and " nk is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic voter-candidate level shock which follows a Type-I extreme value distribution. An example of km is the candidate's ability to bring pork spending to municipality m: P REF is a vector of preference parameters.
x n denotes the characteristics of voter n, including years of education, income level, and an indicator of whether or not the voter is above age 65. z km = fz
g is a vector of observable attributes of candidate k in municipality m: We partition z km depending on how it interacts with voter characteristics. Let z P OS k be the attributes of candidate k which are related to his ideological position such as his party a¢ liation. Let z QLT Y km be other nonideological attributes of candidate k such as the candidate's previous political experience and an indicator of whether municipality m is the candidate's hometown (which is why z km is indexed by m). As for u(x n ; z km ; P REF ), we assume a functional form with a quadratic loss term in the distance between the voter's and the candidate's ideological positions:
where
We consider a unidimensional ideological space, and let the ideology of the voter be a function of his demographics, ID x n , and the ideology of the candidate be P OS z
P OS k
. The utility of the voter depends on the distance between his ideology, ID x n , and that of the candidate,
, which is captured by the quadratic term. The additive term captures the non-ideological component of utility, which we write as QLT Y z QLT Y km . As described in the model section, the objective of a sincere voter is to vote for candidate k, who gives the highest value of u nmk , while the objective of a strategic voter is to vote for candidate k, who gives the highest value of u nmk (T ), where u nmk (T ) = P l2f1;::;Kg T kl (u nmk u nml ).
As we discussed in Section 2, we assume that for at least some candidate pair fk; lg, T kl is positive, no matter how small. This allows us to normalize T so that P k P l>k T kl = 1, because utility representation is invariant to multiplication by a constant factor.
Recall that we denote the type of voter n in municipality m by a random variable nm 2 f0; 1g drawn from a binomial distribution, where nm = 0 denotes the sincere voter and nm = 1 denotes the strategic voter. We also let the mean of the binomial distribution be a random variable drawn for each municipality from some distribution F : Then the probability that voter n in municipality m is a strategic voter can be written as
where m is the municipality-level random term drawn from a Beta distribution, Beta( 1 ; 2 ), denoted as F .
Identi…cation
In this subsection, we discuss the identi…cation of the model when we let the number of districts (denoted as D) go to in…nity. As described in the Data Section, our election data includes observations from many districts, for each of which we have a municipality-level breakdown of vote-share data and demographic characteristics. In terms of our notation, the number of districts is large (D ! 1), but the number of municipalities per electoral district, denoted by M d , is small (M d < 1, 8d 2 f1; :::; Dg). We assume that voting games (i.e., elections) are played in D districts independently of each other, and we treat each district as a unit of observation. Our identi…cation argument proceeds in two steps. We …rst discuss partial identi…cation of preference parameters. Then, given partial identi…cation of preference parameters, we discuss partial identi…cation of the fraction of strategic voters.
Partial Identi…cation of Preference Parameters
Preference parameters are (partially) identi…ed by the relationship between demographic and vote-share variation within each electoral district that we observe in the data. In order to exploit this variation for identi…cation of preference parameters, the main restriction we use is that voters do not vote for their least preferred candidate. This restriction, however, does not give us point identi…cation: The restriction only implies whom a voter will not vote for, but it does not imply whom a voter will vote for. It is important to note that each pair belongs to the same district and that we have many such pairs (from many di¤erent districts). Suppose that the vote share for Party A in the "old"municipalities are 5% higher than in the "young"municipalities on average. Then this implies that being older makes the voters become ideologically closer to Party A: But how much closer depends on the beliefs T d .
In order to exhibit how T d a¤ects identi…cation of above65 , consider two polar cases as in In Case 1, no strategic voter votes for the Party A candidate; hence, the 5% increase in the vote shares of Party A candidates in the "old"municipalities must be attributed to the di¤erence in the sincere voters'behavior alone. Because the 5% increase must be explained The rectangles indicate the respective vote shares. In Case 1, only sincere voters who prefer candidate A the most vote for A. In Case 2, both sincere and strategic voters who prefer candidate A the most vote for A. In Case 1, the 5% di¤erence in the vote share is then attributed to the di¤erence in the behavior of only sincere voters, while it is attributed to the di¤erence in the behavior of both types of voters in Case 2. Thus, the e¤ect of demographic characteristics on utility depends on T .
only by the fraction of the population that is sincere, the e¤ect of the parameter above65 must be quite large. In Case 2, the votes for Party A candidates come not only from sincere voters, but also from strategic voters. The 5% increase in the vote share for Party A candidates can then be accounted for by the di¤erence in the behavior of both sincere and strategic voters. Thus, compared to Case 1, the value of above65 will be relatively small in Case 2 because we can attribute the 5% increase to the di¤erence in the behavior of both types of voters. As identi…ed by taking municipalities across districts and relating the variation in the vote share and candidate characteristics. For example, the e¤ect on utility of electing a candidate with no experience is identi…ed by the di¤erence in the vote shares between candidates with no experience and those with experience, controlling for other candidate and demographic characteristics.
Partial Identi…cation of the Fraction of Strategic Voters
Second, we discuss the identi…cation of the average fraction of strategic voters. In the following discussion, we …x the preference parameters, Intuitively, the variation in the data that we would like to exploit is the variation in the voting outcome among municipalities (in di¤erent districts) with similar characteristics vis-à-vis the variation in the vote shares and characteristics of other municipalities in the same district. For example, consider two districts, one that is generally conservative and another that is liberal. Suppose that we can …nd a liberal municipality from each district. Suppose also that there are three candidates, a liberal, a centrist and a conservative candidate in both districts. If there are no strategic voters, we would not expect the voting outcome to di¤er across the two municipalities. However, in the presence of strategic voters, the voting outcome in these two municipalities could di¤er. If the strategic voters of the municipality in the conservative district believe that the liberal candidate has little chance of winning, those voters would vote for the centrist candidate, while the strategic voters in the other municipality (in the liberal district) would vote for the liberal candidate according to their preferences (if they believe that the liberal candidate has a high chance of winning).
More generally, given the preference parameters, the model can predict what the vote share would be in each municipality if all of the voters voted according to their preferences. If there were no strategic voters, the di¤erence between the actual outcome and the predicted sincere-voting outcome would only be due to random shocks. However, when there is a large number of strategic voters, the actual vote share can systematically diverge from the predicted outcome. This is due to the multiplicity of solution outcomes induced by strategic 23 Our two-step identi…cation strategy can be schematically described as follows. be such that 1 =( 1 + 2 ) 0. In this case, almost every voter votes according to his preferences. Thus, we would not expect the vote share of a municipality to be correlated with the demographic characteristics of other municipalities within the same electoral district. But it could well be the case that voting behavior in a very liberal municipality in a generally conservative electoral district is systematically di¤erent from the voting behavior in a very liberal municpality in a generally liberal district. There are no preference parameters that can rationalize such data patterns. Thus, I 2 (I 1 ( )) . Our two-step procedure has empirical content because preferences are partly identi…ed by demographic and vote-share variation within districts, while the parameters concerning the distribution of are identi…ed by variation across districts.
voters. Recall that strategic voters make voting decisions conditional on the event that their votes are pivotal. If the beliefs regarding the probability of being pivotal di¤er across electoral districts -and we have no reason to believe that they do not -the behavior of strategic voters will also di¤er across districts. This corresponds to di¤erent outcomes being played in di¤erent districts. The example in the previous paragraph is a manifestation of this. We use the di¤erence between the predicted vote share and the actual vote share to partially identify the fraction of strategic voters.
To further illustrate our identi…cation argument, consider the case of three candidates. In this case, the vote shares in municipality m can be drawn as a point in a simplex. Recall that given a particular value of m (the fraction of strategic voters in municipality m) and T , the vote shares can be written as a convex combination of the vote shares of sincere and strategic voters;
where v m is the vector of vote shares of the three candidates (v 1m ; v 2m ; v 3m ) and similarly for v For expositional purposes, we …rst present our identi…cation argument when we can take the number of municipalities to go to in…nity and the municipality level shock m is close to zero. Consider a subset of municipalities in a single electoral district which all have the same demographic characteristics (Note that this does not literally have to be the case because we can control for demographic characteristics once preference parameters are known). In this case, the vote share observations should all lie on the line segment between m (0) = v = m (0)). We also de…ne the point L 0 where the extension of L intersects the boundary m (1) (See Figure 4) . Note that 24 To see this, recall that m (0) is a function of demographic characteristics, and v
ST R m
(T ) is a function of demographic characteristics and T . As the municipalities belong to the same district they share the same T and they share the same demographic characteristics because of the way in which we selected them. Figure 4 . Case A corresponds to the upper bound of the extent of strategic voting, and Case B provides the lower bound. We therefore can partially identify the distribution of m as well as the upper and lower bounds of its mean. Now we discuss how we can modify this discussion to the case where the number of municipalities are …nite but the number of districts goes to in…nity. Parallel to the previous argument, consider subsets of municipalities from each district with the same demographic characteristics. The key di¤erences from the previous situation are that (1) even if we condition on the same demographics, v ST R m (T ) di¤ers across districts because T is not the same across districts, and (2) we can only take a …nite number of municipalities from the same district. Figure 5 illustrates the case where we have three municipalities from two districts. Notice that m (0) is the same across these municipalities because the demographics are the same. However, as municipalities in di¤erent districts have di¤erent In the actual data, the vote shares may not lie on the same line segment as in Figure  5 , even when we take observations from municipalities with the same demographics. Recall that m is the municipality level shock that accounts for this kind of variation. It is true that if we do not restrict the distribution of m in any way, it may not be possible to separately identify the distribution of m and m nonparametrically. However, it should be intuitive from Figure 5 that if restrict the distribution of m to well-behaved distributions which are mean-zero and unimodal, the same intuition would carry through. We assume that the distribution of the random shock m follows a Normal distribution with mean zero. Then, we can parametrically account for the dispersion of vote shares around the line segment and 
Estimation
At the outset, it is useful to clarify the set of parameters that we estimate: They are the preference parameters, P REF , the distribution of strategic voters, ( 1 ; 2 ), and the variance of , . It is important to note that we do not estimate the beliefs T . This is because our unit of observation is the district, and as the number of districts increases, so does the number of tie beliefs T . Because we cannot treat T as parameters, we need restrictions that do not involve T . We estimate the model using an inequality-based estimator developed by Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2007) . If voter beliefs, T , were known (either observed, or uniquely determined by the model), a single outcome would correspond to one realization of the unobserved error terms ( ; ). In such a case, we could employ estimation procedures such as GMM or MLE. However, as discussed in Section 4.2, the multiplicity of outcomes induced by the presence of strategic voters, together with the fact that we cannot observe voter beliefs, T , imply that the model parameters are only partially identi…ed: This makes the use of set-based estimator appropriate.
We construct the moment inequalities using an idea which is somewhat similar to indirect inference (Smith (1993) and Gouriéroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993)). The following explains the steps we take to construct the moment inequalities. A more detailed description of each step is found in Appendix B.
1. Take some district d and denote the municipalities that belong to this district as f1; 2; :::M d g. Regress the vote share data of candidate k in each municipality, v data k;m , on the demographics of each municipality, f m , 26 to obtain the regression coe¢ cient :::; v
3. Parallel to step 1, regress the simulated vote share, v P RED k;m (T d ; m ; m ; ), on the demographic characteristics in each municipality, f m , to obtain the regression coe¢ cient
:::; v
Because we do not know
) to obtain the minimum and maximum values of the regression coe¢ cients as
is the district level vote share data and
) is de…ned as the set of beliefs that is consistent with condition C1. Recall that C1 requires that beliefs be consistent with the vote share outcome. 
] at the true parameter 0 . Thus, we obtain the following moment inequalities;
0, and
Moreover, we can construct moment inequalities conditioning on candidate characteristics z (z only takes discrete values). 27 We can do so by running the regressions in steps 1 and 3 only on a subset of the sample for which candidate characteristics z takes a particular value:
, and
The identi…ed set is the set of that satisfy the above equations.
We base our estimation on the conditional moment inequalities. We take the sample analog of the conditional moment inequalities by repeating steps 1 through 5 for each district. Then, by taking the average, we obtain the criterion function
where kak + = maxf0; ag, and kak = minf0; ag. We then apply Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2007).
Note that in computing the predicted vote shares in Step 3, we use v k;m (T ) in equation (3) . v k;m (T ) is the in…nite counterpart of the vote share V k;m (T ) in equation (3); that is, 27 z only includes variables such as indicators for party a¢ liation and hometown as described in Section 4.1. the probability limit of V k;m (T ) when the number of voters tends to in…nity. Of course, the number of voters in each municipality is …nite, 28 but this is not a problem as long as the error from approximating the vote share by its in…nite counterpart is su¢ ciently small compared to the variance of other error terms in the model.
Extending the Model to Include Voter Turnout Our approach can be extended to include the voter's turnout decision. We can, for example, introduce a cost of voting (or a consumption value of voting) into our model, and allow the voters to abstain. In terms of the standard discrete choice model, this would be analogous to the inclusion of an outside option (e.g., not buying a good). Of course, with this modi…cation, we would no longer be able to normalize T to sum up to 1 (i.e., P k P l>k T kl = 1) as we do in our paper. The scale of T matters for turnout. However, it should be straightforward in principle to identify and estimate a model with voter turnout. The scale of T would be identi…ed by the level of turnout. Then, the identi…cation of the model parameters would follow similarly as the discussion in Section 4.2. Estimation would proceed by simulating the vote shares and turnout for all possible values of T including those that do not add up to 1.
In this paper, we only focus on the issue of strategic voting for computational reasons. In the standard pivotal voter model, turnout is sensitive to small changes in T . For example, a change in T from 10 11 to 10 10 increases the voter's utility of turning out by ten-fold.
This means that we would need to simulate the outcome on a grid in the space of pivot probability that is …ne enough to clearly di¤erentiate values 10 11 , 10 10 (and in between).
Hence, the computational cost of implementing this approach could be very high.
Results and Counterfactual Experiments
Parameter Estimates
The con…dence intervals for the parameters are reported in We can interpret this result as follows. The JCP and the DPJ are close in ideological space relative to the position of the LDP and the YUS, but compared with the JCP, the position of the DPJ is slightly closer to the LDP and the YUS. This is consistent with the general understanding that on the left-right spectrum, the JCP is very liberal, the DPJ is moderately liberal, and the LDP and the YUS are moderately conservative. Regarding voter positions, 29 If we let the …rst three elements of the vector z QLT Y km be dummy variables for whether (1) candidate k has been an incumbent, (2) has had previous political experience, or (3) has had no political experience, then the …rst three elements of z Thus we need to normalize one of the coe¢ cients (The fact that we are dealing with a discrete choice model precludes us from including a constant term as well.). For the same reason, below65 and hometown4 are normalized to 0. As for LDP , this is normalized to 0 because only the di¤erence between the candidate's ideology, P OS z P OS k , and the voter's ideology, ID x n matter. Note that because we include a constant term in z captures the e¤ect of having a hometown in the same municipality as the voter, and hometown2 is the e¤ect of having a hometown in the same electoral district but in a di¤erent municipality. hometown3 is the e¤ect of having a hometown in the same prefecture as the voter but not in the same electoral district, and lastly, hometown4 = 0 is the e¤ect of having a hometown in a di¤erent prefecture. The results show that voters receive the highest utility from a candidate whose hometown is in the same municipality as theirs, and the utility decreases as the distance between the candidate's hometown and the voters'municipality increases. Finally, the mean of the distribution of strategic voters ( 1 =( 1 + 2 )) is estimated to be between 0:753 and 0.803, that is, [75.3%, 80.3%] of voters are strategic voters on average. This may sound surprising given the fact that the fraction of strategic voting reported in previous studies is between 3% and 17%. However, note that the fraction of "strategic voting" reported in previous studies is in fact the fraction of misaligned voting, as discussed in the Introduction, and not the standard de…nition of strategic voting (See, e.g., the entry of "strategic voting" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics by Feddersen (2008) .). Misaligned voting is an equilibrium behavior of strategic voters, and strategic voters may or may not vote for their most preferred candidate. In order to compare our result with the previous studies, we use the estimated model to compute the extent of misaligned voting in the next subsection.
Extent of Misaligned Voting
The extent of misaligned voting is given by the fraction of voters who do not vote for the most preferred candidate. Because we do not have any individual voting records (we only observe vote shares at the municipality level), we still face the task of identifying the extent of misaligned voting from aggregate data; that is, from the di¤erence in the actual vote shares and the counterfactual vote shares we simulate using the estimated model, under the assumption that all voters vote sincerely. Identifying the extent of misaligned voting is not straightforward because there could be misaligned voting at the individual level, but the in ‡ow of misaligned votes to candidate k (i.e., votes cast for candidate k by voters who do not prefer k the most) and the out ‡ow of misaligned votes from candidate k may cancel each other out in the aggregate at the municipality level. Additionally, computing what the outcome would have been if all voters voted sincerely is itself not a simple task. This is because (1) the realization of municipality level shocks ( ) cannot be uniquely recovered and (2) the model parameters are set identi…ed. We describe how to deal with these issues in Appendix C.
We obtained the upper and lower bounds of misaligned voting as 2:4% and 5:5%, that is, about [2.4%, 5.5%] of all voters voted for a candidate that they did not prefer most. Our estimates of misaligned voting are comparable to the numbers reported in the existing literature, ranging from 3% to 17%. Also, given that the estimated fraction of strategic voters is about [75.3%, 80.3%] of the population on average, the fraction of strategic voters who did not vote for their most preferred candidate is [3.0%, 7.3%].
Counterfactual Experiments
Proportional Representation
In our …rst counterfactual experiment, we consider what the election outcome would have been under proportional representation instead of plurality rule. In a typical election under proportional representation, voters cast ballots for parties rather than for individual candidates and parties are allotted seats in proportion to the vote share. As votes would not be wasted under proportional representation, there is little incentive for voters to vote strategically. Thus, minor parties generally gain more votes and seats than they would under plurality rule.
We computed the counterfactual vote share by assuming that all voters vote for the party whose ideological position is closest to their own. 30 We also allowed the voters to vote for Table 5 : Counterfactual Experiment -Proportional Representation. Acutual vote share is computed by aggregating the number of votes for a party across all of the 175 districts and dividing it by the total number of votes cast in the 175 districts. Thus they add up to 100% (c.f., Table 6 ).
any of the four parties regardless of whether a party actually …elded a candidate in the voter's district or not. Hence, there are two e¤ects that account for the di¤erence in the vote shares between the actual election and the counterfactual experiment. One e¤ect is the change in the behavior of strategic voters (sincere-voting e¤ect). The second is the e¤ect of expanding the choice set (choice-expansion e¤ect). The second e¤ect is present because in the counterfactual experiment, we let the voters vote for parties regardless of whether a party …elded a candidate in the voter's district. In our next counterfactual experiment, we will try to isolate and quantify each of the two e¤ects. Table 5 compares the vote shares and the number of seats each party obtains in the experiment with the actual data under plurality rule. Firstly, the vote share for the DPJ and the LDP would be smaller under proportional representation. As we will con…rm in the next counterfactual experiment, a large part of the decrease can be explained by the choiceexpansion e¤ect. Secondly, the vote share for the YUS would be larger in the counterfactual experiment. The fact that the YUS did not …eld candidates in many districts increased its vote share under the counterfactual through the choice-expansion e¤ect (We …nd almost no sincere-voting e¤ect in the next experiment for the YUS).
As for the number of seats in the counterfactual experiment, we simply multiplied the vote shares of each party by the number of total districts (175). The di¤erence between the actual and the counterfactual is even greater for the number of seats than for vote shares because votes are translated very di¤erently into seats under plurality and proportionality. Table 6 : Counterfactual Experiment -Sincere Voting under Plurality Rule. Acutual vote share is computed by taking the average of the vote shares only over districts in which the party …elded a candidate. Thus, they do not add up to 100% (c.f., Table 5 ).
Sincere Voting under Plurality Rule
In our second counterfactual experiment, we investigate what the outcome would have been if all voters had voted sincerely under plurality rule. It is well known from Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) that there does not exist a strategy-proof voting mechanism (except for a dictatorial mechanism or a mechanism in which a particular candidate is never chosen under any circumstances). Even though a strategy-proof voting mechanism does not exist, we can simulate the sincere-voting outcome under any mechanism because we have recovered the primitives of the model. In this experiment, we compute the sincere-voting outcome under plurality rule. This exercise also enables us to isolate the sincere-voting e¤ect as we discussed in the previous subsection. Table 6 compares the actual vote shares and the number of seats with those of the sincerevoting experiment (Note that the vote shares do not add up to 100% because the vote shares are computed by taking the average of the vote shares only over districts in which the party …elded a candidate). The details on how we obtained Table 6 are provided in Appendix D.
We …nd that the number of seats for the DPJ and the LDP change signi…cantly in spite of the fact that the extent of misaligned voting is small [2.4%, 5.5%]. The DPJ would add [17, 40] seats and the LDP would lose [20, 45] seats. Compared to the relatively small change in the vote share, the change in the number of seats is considerable. Note that this di¤erence in the number of seats is accounted for by misaligned voting. Even though the extent of misaligned voting is small, the impact on the number of seats is large because the winning margin is often small.
With respect to vote shares, we …nd that the vote shares for the JCP and the DPJ increase while the vote share for the LDP decreases in our experiment. This is what we would expect given that the LDP candidates tended to be strong while some fraction of DPJ candidates and even a greater fraction of the JCP candidates were not. On the other hand, we …nd that the sincere-voting e¤ect for the YUS is nearly zero. This implies that the gain in the vote share for the YUS in the previous counterfactual experiment is due mostly to the choice-expansion e¤ect. Our …ndings also suggest that a large part of the decrease in the vote shares in the previous experiment for the LDP and the DPJ are due to the choice-expansion e¤ect. Lastly, given that vote share for the JCP remains almost unchanged in the previous experiment, the choice-expansion e¤ect and the strategic-voting e¤ect for the JCP were of similar magnitude, but worked in opposite directions.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study how to identify and estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify its impact on election outcomes by adopting an inequality-based estimator. Preference and voting behavior do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence for strategic voters, and we obtain partial identi…cation of preference parameters from the restriction that voting for the least preferred candidate is a weakly dominated strategy. The extent of strategic voting is identi…ed using particular features of general-election data. We also make a clear distinction between strategic voting and misaligned voting.
By using aggregate data from the Japanese general election, we …nd that a large proportion of voters are strategic voters. We estimate the fraction of strategic voters to be [75.3%, 80.3%], on average. A counterfactual experiment that introduces proportional representation decreases the number of votes for major-party candidates by a large margin, and the number of seats by an even greater margin. In the second counterfactual experiment, which assumes sincere voting by all voters under plurality, we …nd that the number of seats for the parties change signi…cantly. Even though the extent of misaligned voting is small [2.4%, 5.5%], the impact on the number of seats is considerable because the winning margin is often small.
One of the important issues that we did not deal with in this paper is voter turnout. Voters'beliefs on pivot events are also important for models of voter turnout, and it may be possible to extend our approach in this direction. We leave this for future research.
are the expression for the vote share for candidate k among sincere and strategic voters. Now, we construct moment inequalities based on the regression coe¢ cients in each electoral district.
Step 1 Take some z and some district d. We obtain Step 2 Fix some parameter , beliefs T d , and values
. We can compute the vote shares for candidate k in each of the municipalities which we denote as (v
We can obtain a closed form solution for the predicted vote share of sincere voters because " is distributed type 1 exteme value. Regarding strategic voters, the predicted vote share does not have a closed form solution, and we use Monte-Carlo integration. For Monte-Carlo integration, we take 10 draws of " for each demographic characteristics, x. As we group the voters into 32 types according to their characteristics x, 32 we take 320 draws of " for each municipality. 31 As in footnote 28, we can identify the distribution of demographic characteristics f m with a vector of probabilities. We use the same notation f m to denote the distribution and the vector of probabilities. The vector f m contains, for example, the fraction of the population above 65, the fraction of population in di¤erent income ranges, etc. 32 We discretize income into four groups, age into two groups, and education into four groups. Thus, we have 4 2 4 = 32 types.
Step 3 Parallel to Step 1, regress the simulated vote shares of candidate k, (v
, on the demographic characteristics in each municipality (f 1 ; :::
conditioning on a particular value of z. We obtain the regression coe¢ cient as
Step Step 6 Finally, to improve the sharpness of the identi…ed set, we include another type of moment inequalities that harnesses the comovements in that results from varying T . Notice that in
Step 4, we have computed the maximum and the minimum values of separately for each of the 9 types of regressions. But note that the coe¢ cients from the regressions cannot move independently. Thus in an e¤ort to use some of these restrictions, we can construct additional moment inequalities by taking linear combination of . For example, let OLD k;d and RICH k;d be the regression coe¢ cients that we obtain in Steps 1 and 4 when we regress vote shares on the proportion of the population above 65 and the proportion of the population in the highest income quartile, respectively. Then we can consider max fT d g (
and use this to form moment inequalities. More generally, for any matrix A, we can consider
and construct moment inequalities by following the same argument presented in the main text. We provide the exact form of matrix A that we use in our estimation in the Supplementary Material.
Appendix C: Comuptation of Misaligned Voting
The amount of misaligned voting is given by the fraction of voters who do not vote for the most preferred candidate. As we discussed in the main text, we do not have any individual voting records (we only observe vote shares at the municipality level), so we need to identify the extent of misaligned voting from aggregate data. In Step 1, we discuss issues arising from identifying the extent of misaligned voting from aggregated data, assuming that we can precisely recover the outcome when everyone votes sincerely. Then, in Steps 2 to 4, we will discuss issues related to recovering the sincere voting outcome from the estimated model.
Step 1 Let v data k denote the actual vote share for candidate k and let v sin k denote the vote share of candidate k when everyone votes sincerely (subscripts d; m are suppressed from now on): Also, let D kl denote the total votes cast for candidate k by strategic voters who prefer candidate l most (in ‡ow/out ‡ow of misaligned votes from l to k). Then the object of interest, the amount of misaligned voting, can be expressed as 
We provide an analogous expression for K = 4 in the Supplementary material. These bounds are also sharp among all bounds that can be obtained without imposing any distributional assumptions on the shocks in the utility function. 33 The proofs are provided in the Supplementary material.
Step 2 to
Step 4 Now we discuss issues related to recovering the sincere voting outcome from the estimated model. Given preference parameters of the model, for any realization of , we can compute what the outcome would be if all voters vote sincerely. We denote this predicted sincerevoting outcome as v sin ( b ; ). Ideally, we would know the actual realization of ; = 0 in each municipality, and compute the sincere voting outcome, v sin ( b ; 0 ), using this actual realization of 0 and using a parameter value in the estimated set, b 2 b CI . Then the di¤erence between the observed vote share, v data and v sin ( b ; 0 ),
would allow us to compute the lower and upper bounds, lb(f k g) and ub(f k g). However, 0 cannot be recovered uniquely. Also, the di¤erence between v data = v( 0 ) and v sin ( b ; ) depends on b , which we have only set-identi…ed. Hence, we compute the bounds on the extent of misaligned voting in the following three steps (Step 2 to Step 4). In
Step 2, …x b 2 b CI . For any given draw of fromF , we compute b k ( ),
and the corresponding bounds lb(f b k ( )g) and ub(f b k ( )g). By Monte Carlo, we then compute the expected value of the bounds where the expectation is taken with regard to the randomness in ,
and
for each municipality, whereF is the estimated distribution of . Note that Lb 0 and U b 0 do not necessarily coincide with lb(f b k ( 0 )g) and ub(f b k ( 0 )g), which are the lower and upper bounds of the extent of misaligned voting we would obtain if we had full knowledge of the realizations of , = 0 . Therefore, we need to account for the parts of Lb 0 and U b 0 that are induced by the randomness in . We discuss this in Step 3. In Step 3, we evaluate the components of Lb 0 and U b 0 that are induced by the randomness in . To do so, we compute the mean e¤ects of the randomness components by calculating (using Monte Carlo integration) Lb = Z Z lb(f e k ( e ; e e )g)dF ( e e )dF ( e ); and U b = Z Z ub(f e k ( e ; e e )g)dF ( e e )dF ( e );
where e k ( e ; e e ) is the di¤erence in the vote share between two realizations of municipalitylevel shock, e and e e , i.e., In Step 4, we account for the fact that is only set-identi…ed. So far, we have been computing LB and U B implicitly treating as given. By denoting the dependence on more explicitly, LB and U B above can be written as LB( ) and U B( ). Because is partially identi…ed, we need to compute LB( ) and U B( ) by allowing to move in the partially identi…ed set CI in order to construct the most conservative bound on the extent of misaligned voting, LB and U B, i.e. 
LB = min
Appendix D: Comupation of Second Counterfactual
Computation of the second counterfactual proceeds in the same way as described in Steps 2 to 4 in Appendix B. This is because as was the case in our …rst counterfactual, we cannot recover the realization of the municipality level random shock ; = 0 . Denote the counterfactual vote share as v sin ( b ; 0 ). The problem is that we cannot compute this because 0 is unobserved. But we can obtain bounds for v sin ( b ; 0 ) by following the same procedure as in Appendix C. We can also compute the number of seats in the same way. Note that we do not need to take Step 1 in this case. the candidate is in the district (but outside municipality m), hometown of the candidate is in municipality mg:
In order to improve the sharpness of the identi…ed set, we include another type of moment inequalities that harnesses the comovements in that results from changes in T as dissussed in Step 6 of Appendix B. We augment the moment conditions by using restrictions on the comovement of the coe¢ cients for the 9th type of regressions. This allows us to add restrictions on the pairwise di¤erence in the s that relate to the e¤ect of candidates'experience and hometowns, e.g., the di¤erence in the vote share for a LDP candidate whose hometown is outside of the prefecture compared to a LDP candidate whose hometown is within the prefecture. In practice, the matrix A used in Step 6 in our estimation is 
Supplementary Material B
In this Supplementary Material, we prove that the bounds ub(f k g) and lb(f k g) we have used in Appendix C in fact constitute bounds and that they are sharp. Because the bounds are di¤erent for K = 3 and K = 4; we prove each case in turn. We drop subscripts d and m for the rest of the section.
and #f k > 0g indicates the number of k s that are positive, and 1f g is an indicator
